

Executive Summary:

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The ENRI-East study was aimed at a deeper understanding of the ways in which the modern European identities and regional cultures are formed and inter-communicated in the Eastern part of the European continent. The project addresses both macro and micro influences in a broader historical perspective with a strong focus on applying bottom-up processes of identity formation by drawing on actual practices. This enables the detailed exploration of the ways in which European, national, and regional identities are constituted and negotiated through individual and group narratives and practices within an increasingly complex set of institutional arrangements.

Project's research motto is 'Moving peoples and moving borders'. This slogan reflects a highly dynamic social and political landscape of the Eastern Europe. One can observe that in a very short historical perspective, during the last 20 years, new countries have emerged (such as Macedonia or Estonia), while other countries changed their geographical outlines (such as Serbia or Germany). On the other hand, the massive migration flows (regardless of their legality or illegality, peaceful or violent historical epochs, political or economic migration reasons) do influence heavily cultural or social infrastructures of both receiving and issuing countries. Altogether, 8-10 million people that belong now to ethnic minorities throughout Eastern Europe have been affected by historically and politically set boundaries.

The ENRI-East project aimed at the detailed study of the impacts of these two moving factors on the everyday lives of peoples and their feelings of belongingness or social affiliation. The study was guided by the fundamental rationale of the EU, namely to enlarge the zone of European peace and prosperity in a continuous process, without generating new artificial boundaries. Analysis and interpretation has been conducted with the aim of improving the status quo, identifying and solving problems through the elaboration of viable and realistic recommendations.

Such a comparative study has never been conducted before and has required the development of new types of empirical instruments ethno-linguistic, ethno-cultural that, in combination with mainstream quantitative and qualitative instruments, make this study unique. It addresses the complicated issues of post-communist Europe concerning historic memories and cultural heritage.

Its results will enable EU and European NGOs to understand and address such emotional matters as symbolic attachments to ethnic homelands and better understand peoples' cultural identities, thereby leading to more compassionate and tolerant European attitudes and community relations.

The project's empirical research has focused on the nations states on both sides of the new Eastern border of the European Union. Research was carried out in the following countries: Poland, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, and Germany. The project explored particular cases of nations and ethnic groups that live on both sides of the main political dividing line that now splits the European continent into at least two geo-political parts. One part is constituted by the European Union to the West of this line, while the Eastern part of the continent is composed of countries that formed the Soviet Union and are now conventionally labelled as NIS (Newly Independent States). In this larger geo-political region, one can identify about two dozen divided nations or ethnic groups that have found themselves on both sides of the new geopolitical fence.

Project Context and Objectives:

PROJECT CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES

The project ENRI-East: Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities: nations between states along the new eastern borders of the European Union was aimed at a deeper understanding of the ways in which the modern European identities and regional cultures are formed and inter-communicated in the Eastern part of the European continent. We have addressed both macro and micro influences in a broader historical perspective with a strong focus on applying bottom-up processes of identity formation by drawing on actual practices. This enabled us exploring the ways in which European, national, and regional identities are constituted and negotiated through individual and group narratives and practices within an increasingly complex set of institutional arrangements.

Our empirical research focused on the nations states on both sides of the new Eastern border of the European Union. Research was carried out in the following states: Poland, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, and Germany. The project explored particular cases of nations and ethnic groups that live on both sides of the main political dividing line that now splits the European continent into at least two geo-political parts. One part is constituted by the European Union to the West of this line, while the Eastern part of the continent is composed of countries that formed the Soviet Union and are now conventionally labelled as NIS (Newly Independent States). In this particular geo-political region, one can identify about two dozen divided nations or ethnic groups that have found themselves on both sides of the new geopolitical fence. An estimated 8 to 10 million people, one half of which live in the EU countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Germany, etc.) whereas the other half in the former soviet republics (such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia and other countries) are affected by this situation. In certain countries, these ethnic minorities may constitute up to 30% of their total population, as, for instance, Russians in Latvia. An essential commonality among these groups is that they have large parts of the population living outside of the state borders of their ethnic home nations.

Such divided nations are the product of moving borders or moving people. By this criteria one can distinguish, for the purpose of our research

- classic minorities, e.g. those groups who never migrated, but the state borders around them moved many times in the historical past, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. For instance, Hungarians living now in Western Ukraine; Russians in the Baltic states; or Poles living in Belarus);
- recent migrants, such as Russian Jews or other citizens of the former USSR who have migrated to European countries during the last one or two decades;
- historical migrants, such as Germans who had been migrating to the Russian Empire since the 18th Century and now are returning back to the modern Germany.

In the ENRI-East project we have investigated several such split nations regarding their European, national, regional and ethnic identities. Most of the peoples in our empirical research are classic minorities which means that they have never moved but new nation states have evolved and/or new geo-political borders have been drawn which has made them an ethnic minority in the very same location. The research covers 12 ethnic minorities from 8 countries along the new Eastern border of

the European Union. Regarding the selection of the ethnic minorities, for each country the largest ethnic minority/minorities have been taken into account:

Table 1 Ethnic minority group population statistics selected for ENRI-VIS

(see the core text file for the table)

Additionally, we have investigated two more ethnic minorities: ethnic Germans from CIS countries (who have returned to live in Germany, historical migrants) and Russian Jews in Germany (recent migrants).

The project focuses on the analysis of the social past and present of these selected national or ethnic groups that might be considered as particular examples of nations between the states. Due to the multiplicity of social and political contexts of their social existence, we expected these groups to have constructed multiple identities referring to both their mother ethnicity and the surrounding contextual social habits and cultures of their host country. The empirical research in the project followed the following research questions:

- What does it mean to be European, belonging to a nation or region for the specified groups?
- What are the general perceptions of Europe and nations in these countries with respect to the own nationality?
- What are the images of Europe, nations and nation-states like among the specified groups?
- What is the interplay between regional, national and supranational self-identification of these people like in the EU-CIS borderlands?
- What are the practices, narratives and discourses concerning compatibility and incompatibility of identities under the condition of belonging to a minority in these countries?
- Under what conditions do strong national identities prevail on the one hand and when do people claim more particular (regional) or universal (European, cosmopolitan) identities?
- How are identities constructed in order to fulfill a possible need of differentiation between Europe, the nation and the region?
- How do identities of members of the same national background compare across borders and national groups?
- What are the ways in which identities are articulated and reproduced in the private (e.g. family) and public domains?

In order to answer the research questions, to follow both macro and micro levels and to consider our bottom-up approach, we have developed the following research design:

- Theoretical state-of-the-art research
- Historical state of the art desktop research
- Collection of surveys
- Quantitative data collection and analysis: ENRI-VIS

- Qualitative data collection and analysis: ENRI-BIO (Biographical interviews with members of three different generations)
- Qualitative data collection and analysis: ENRI-EXI (Expert interviews)
- Pilot study with quantitative and qualitative elements on cultural identities and music?: ENRI-MUSIC; carried out in Hungary and Lithuania
- Online data collection and content analysis of weblogs and online periodicals run or maintained by ethnic minority groups: ENRI-BLOG

The methodological toolbox developed for the specific requirements of the region and the minorities under study consists of an interlocking smart mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. Since the major objective of the study was to generate comparative data, the key component was a large-scale formalized survey dubbed ENRI Values and Identities Survey (ENRI-VIS), which also serves as a common point of reference for all other data sets produced by other methods.

After defining which ethnic minority groups in which countries we were going to research, we set up rules for the sample size of the set of national samples for the quantitative survey. Every ethnic minority is considered a separate sample with either 400 or 800 minorities. The sample size depends on the size of the researched ethnic minority group in absolute numbers and on the proportion within the whole national population. The information of the size of the researched minority group was based on national statistics. As a result, we defined the sample size as 800 for seven ethnic minority groups (Russians in Latvia, Russians in Lithuania, Poles in Lithuania, Hungarians in Ukraine, Poles in Ukraine, Poles in Belarus and Hungarians in Slovakia) and the sample size as 400 for four ethnic minority groups (Belarusians in Poland, Ukrainians in Poland, Slovaks in Hungary, Lithuanians in Russia/Kaliningrad region).

For the proportion of the ethnic minority group within the whole population we refer to as the ethnic density of a minority group. The ethnic density for each settlement or at least each district was calculated based on national statistical data. Basically we used LAU1 data for EU countries and data on a district or province level for CIS countries. The goal was to gain a systematic representation of at least 75% of each researched ethnic minority group. Depending on the size of each minority group's ethnic density, we applied different sampling methods. For locations (settlement or district) where the ethnic density was 30% or higher we used systematic random route sampling (RRS), for locations where the ethnic density was between 10% and 30% we applied random route sampling boosted with focused enumeration (RRFE), and for locations where the density was less than 10%, we had to collect data following the principle of snowballing with several pre-defined starting points (such as ethnic minority organizations).

Data collection took place in winter 2009/2010 and the interviews were carried out face-to-face by professional in-country sociological agencies. In order to be an eligible respondent, the approached persons had to fulfill three formal criteria: to be 18 years or older, to have been living in the country for at least 12 months and to identify themselves as members of the particular ethnic minority group. The interviews were carried out in the preferred language of the respondent (either in the language of the host country or in the language of the ethnic home country).

In order to ensure high data quality, internal peer-reviewed data control was applied. After all data have been cleaned and homogenized, the full, unified data set consists of 6,800 respondents and covered 12 ethnic minorities in 8 countries.

Many questions in our questionnaire are compatible with several major international surveys .

The questionnaire covers the following broad topics:

- (a) General information about the respondent;
- (b) Ethno-national perceptions, practices, networking;
- (c) Social and political attitudes and practices

For all researched ethnic minority groups we have also applied the qualitative methods of biographical interviews (Roberts, 2002; Chamberlaine, Bornat, & Wengraf 2000) and expert interviews (Meuser & Nagel, 2010; Bogner, Littig, & Menz 2005). For each minority group 12 biographical interviews (ENIR-BIO) were conducted; in total we collected 144 interviews. The interviews were carried out in the languages of preference and lasted about 1.5 hours on average. Again we have applied internal quality control to ensure high data quality. The sampling frame for the biographical interviews included gender and age, and regarding age we were approaching three generations:

- The young generation who were born and brought up in the post-communist era (16 to 22 years old);
- The middle generation who experienced the transition and are older enough to be the parents of the younger generation (35 to 50 years old);
- The older generation who would have experienced the Second World War (65 years and older).

The expert interviews (ENRI-EXI) did not only cover the 12 ethnic minorities as described above but also included Germany as special case. In Germany, the two minority groups of ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees, both having emigrated mainly from CIS countries, have been researched. In total, 42 expert interviews were carried out; two to four interviews per ethnic minority group. Out of these, one to two interviews were carried out with governmental or non-governmental representatives of ethnic minority groups (from the national or regional level), and one to two interviews with ethnic minority organizations (political, cultural, religious organizations).

For the online content analysis (ENRI-BLOG) four types of sources have been collected:

- Online periodicals issued by representatives of ethnic minority groups;
- Websites of political, cultural, religious organizations of ethnic minority groups;
- Websites of broadcasting services of ethnic minority groups;
- Personal and non-personal blogs, live journals, discussion forums.

Finally, a pilot study on music and identity (ENRI-MUSIC) was conducted in Lithuania and Hungary, applying another range of quantitative and qualitative methods.

Project Results:

MAIN SCIENTIFIC RESULTS AND FOREGROUNDS

THEORIES OF IDENTITIES MAJOR TRENDS AND BEYOND

The Making of Identities in Eastern European Border Regions: Theoretical Frameworks of the Study

National divides are among the most strongly felt across our world (Epstein, 2007). Nonetheless, the nation-state is a very successful form of human political and social organization, albeit its pure form, i.e. where one nation maintains its own state, remains an illusion. The number of ethnic minorities is considerable in almost every country in the world. This renders the idea of the nation-state and its actual consequences problematic for smaller or larger parts of the population. This is particularly true for Eastern European countries. For instance, the Russian minorities in the Baltic States (especially in Estonia and Latvia) compose a third of the respective country's total population. Most notably, these minorities contribute significantly to the multinational character of what is usually considered the nation-state of, for instance, Estonia, Poland or Belarus.

A relevant political and social issue then is what the relationship between the majority national group and the minority (and ethnic groups respectively) is like. Here, various propositions are presented in the literature. They range from illiberal discriminatory practices to perspectives based on the mutual recognition of difference, equal rights and opportunities and, generally, equality with specific acknowledgment of the minority identity. Whereas relationships characterised by discrimination of the minority group are usually dismissed in the Western world, a lively debate emerged around the issues of (minority) nationalism, liberalism, multiculturalism, and, most recently, cosmopolitanism.

In the literature on liberal nationalism, we mainly find references to language and history as markers of national (minority) identity. The study of the meanings of national identities is therefore of great importance. What particular characteristics of the minority nation make it a worthwhile project to maintain national identity? What is so particular about national language, history, culture and values that should be secured in one or the other way? And what are the differences in national identity compared to other ones, especially the majority nation?

Studying identities in this way is especially relevant for national minorities in the border regions between Europe and Russia. Here, various and competing identity claims coincide to a particularly strong extent. Theoretically speaking, we can easily distinguish between ethnic, regional, national (referring to the majority/and or minority nation) and greater identities, such as a European one, a Russian one, a Slavonic one in some cases and so on. But how do they concur? What is their particular content and meaning? What is the relationship between them?

Identity: Regional National European

The concept of identity has a strong foothold in psychological (Erikson, 1994 [1959]), social-psychological (e.g. Tajfel, 1982) and sociological studies (see, for instance, Giddens, 1991; Jenkins, 1996). In the latter tradition, Anderson (1991), Gellner (1983) and Smith (1986, 2008) are arguably among the most prominent scholars researching one particular form of national identity. Whereas

psychology highlights the importance of identity in the development of personality, scholars in the social-psychological tradition elaborate on in-group and out-group mechanisms in social relationships between members of various groups. Sociologists are mainly occupied with collective identities?the collective dimension of identities of individuals. These are social because they are constituted in part by socially transmitted conceptions of how a person of that identity properly behaves (Appiah, 2005: 21) and most often refer to particular features of people. In creating labels for certain (groups of) people, specific ideas develop about the people who fit these labels. In turn, this then shapes the ways people conceive of themselves and others: labels operate to mould what we may call identification, the process through which individuals shape their projects [?] by reference to available labels, available identities (Appiah, 2005: 66)

National Identity

Nationalism offers a perspective on identity, which is heavily characterised by this sense of (subjective) belonging to a distinct group based on shared features such as language and history. The national community is thereby seen as the ultimate warrant of individual autonomy. Members of such communities are offered some sort of guidelines for the full spectrum of social interactions: their national identity provides a script?a narrative?useful for their life plans. The national culture provides a framework of reference for everyday actions, i.e. through cultural membership people make sense of the world (Tamir, 1993). It is in this respect that cultural membership (attachment to the group, feelings of belonging, self-views as a member) as expressed in national identity epitomizes individual freedom. More important, national identity arguably structures life to a particular extent and enables people, as identities do in general, to fit [their] life story into certain patterns [?] and [they] also fit that story into larger stories; for example, of a people (Appiah, 2005: 68). This, in turn, presents an explanation of the value of strength of national identities and their ubiquity.

But what are national identities like Not every description is as vivid as Gammer?s (2006) about Chechen national identity as one of (physical) strength, loyalty, sacrifice for the community, equality and freedom as vividly endorsed in their emblem, an image of a wolf (pp. 6-8). Nevertheless, the contents of identity, i.e. the features of people, revolve around stereotypes and beliefs about typical characteristics and behaviours of the labelled people and result in a social conception of them once a consensus about them is achieved. Both internationalisation by the labelled and being treated as a member of this group by others then reinforce any identity (see Appiah, 2005, chapter 3).

However, in modern liberal democracies, self-perceptions of the national community such as the one?rather pre-modern?above become problematic. They are hardly acceptable as a justification for claims of autonomy/independence because they do not mark cultural distinctions in Western modern multination-states in a positive sense. In most liberal democratic societies, stereotypes and expectations are generally more likely to be subject to critical reflexion. Accordingly, boundaries between different nationalities/ethnicities can only be drawn in a more subtle way?without referencing unsubstantiated stereotypes and clichés as these would not easily find a consensus and rather be rejected by the majority of (liberal) citizens.

Following Wimmer (2008), we could nevertheless make use of some features of people as constituting the element of cultural differentiation in his multilevel process theory of ethnic boundary making. Cultural differentiation occupies a central position in the nature of boundaries, amongst three other dimensions: political salience, social closure, and stability. Cultural differentiation may indeed

make a difference (Wimmer, 2008: 982) and could render the demarcation between various national groups most recognizable, even self-evident. This cultural stuff would include perceived unique cultural practices, ancient (historical) myths, or phenotypical similarities (Jenkins, 1997; Weber, 1978; Wimmer, 2008). This could, for example, include a common history and ancestry, experience with nature, society and evidence of solidarity with other identity group members as well as other (more or less) stereotypical self-images and images imposed by others.

Let us briefly come back to our prime interest in minority nationalism. Notwithstanding the positive value of national identity and cultural group membership, we also have to ask more critically what hinders (members of) national minorities in multination-states to realize autonomy. Put differently, what are the properties of the majority culture/the nation-state which exacerbate self-realisation of minority national identity And where are the crucial differences in national identity between majority and minority which are believed to justify nationalism This is not to impede or avoid old or new national ambitions; however, it casts a more critical light on nationalisms with a view to the character of distinctiveness. It goes without saying, however, that the majority also bears responsibility in this dialectic. In particular, we have to ask ourselves whether the majority has appealed to the consent of the governed and represents the total of the people?. Thus, only if there are acceptable liberal reasons for a distinct cultural membership (which are the more acceptable the less liberal majority nationalism), will nationalism be justifiable. Otherwise, national movements only lead us to believe that they have a substantive cultural backup whilst pursuing other, probably illiberal purposes or exploiting current feelings of dissatisfaction among the national minority with, for example, the majority government or state. Here, we should then be interested in the minority's view on the differences. This should help give (preliminary) answers to questions raised by Appiah (2005) about how to treat existing (national) identities on the one hand and what (national) identities would ideally be like.

Regional and Supranational Identity

Notwithstanding the crucial role of national identity, as a collective identity it will only remain one among others individuals and groups can make use of with a view to their manifold purposes. Here, we want to talk about two other forms of territorially based identities. We will briefly discuss regional identities and comment on identities which go beyond the ethnic/national community. In the latter sense, we will engage with supranational European identity and Great Russia?-identity which are of specific interest for this study.

Regional identities can be considered as a more local form of identification, with an emphasis on the locality and region, e.g. a neighbourhood identity in a city, an urban identity in a county, and a county identity in a state. What seems apparent is the nested character of a regional/local identity. It exists within the boundaries of a bigger whole?. Thus, regional identities are often found in large and federal states, where they make claims to specific local contexts.

However, regional identities might also be an instrument at hands of groups of people distinguishing themselves from the national?. In this latter sense, they are not necessarily nested anymore. One could have a regional identity without a national one, for instance. Regional identities could also overlap with ethnic ones in case ethnic groups live together in a given territory. Here, the boundary to a minority national identity is rather blurred. It will then depend on whether such an ethnic group

aspires to conceive itself as a nation to differentiate between a regional identity and a national identity.

Identities beyond the nation state might also be relevant for the study of recent identity making in Eastern Europe. We examine supranational identities in order to round off our study of identity. This is, then, of particular relevance in Eastern European border regions where many countries have recently joined the European Union whilst other countries remain more loyal to Russia as far as political, social and cultural affairs are concerned. Here we present a brief framework of how these supranational identities are conceptualised and how they interact with other forms of identification.

European Identity

The notion of a European identity encapsulates cultural and political meanings. A cultural European identity, some commentators believe, rests on a common historical-cultural memory and heritage of Europeans (for instance, Eder, 2004; Llobera, 2003). These are supposed to result from historical processes and be more or less directly derived from the common experiences of Greek-Roman ancient civilization, Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, industrialization and Modernity. According to this image, contemporary Europe has reached an agreement on basic elements of cultures such as religion, shared values or political, social and economic beliefs. Here, we clearly notice that the notion of European culture is still under construction?. Whereas the existing of national cultures is often taken for granted when claims about national identities are made (Appiah, 2005), European identity based on cultural elements is fiercely contested.

Adversaries to cultural European identity promote, if at all, a concept of political European identity (e.g Cederman, 2001; Harris, 2003). Based on the Treaty of Maastricht, European identity rests on concepts of citizenship. European citizenship, then, assumes the regulation of the relationship between people and the EU in ways similar to the original concept of national citizenship, that is via rights and duties (for instance, Faist, 2000; Shaw, 1997). Constitutional patriotism (Calhoun, 2002; Cronin, 2003; Habermas, 1998; 2001) highlights the need for a common legal framework in order to establish common ground for identification. It relies on strong commitment to basic human rights and procedural norms. Constitutional patriotism assumes that a political identity can be built on principles of universality and autonomy that underpin the concepts of democracy and the rule of law (Lacroix, 2002:945). It further subscribes to limits to political loyalty and loyalty to the legally enacted constitution (Calhoun, 2002:149).

Is there at all a need for such a European identity, be it cultural and/or political Ongoing economic, political and social integration in Europe have created powerful institutions which exercise growing powers over their member states and people (Breakwell, 2004; Castano, 2004). Furthermore, a common identity would promise getting support, achieving legitimacy and further integration in a democratic way, especially from an identity politics perspective (for instance, Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; Paasi, 2001; Rumford, 2003). Whilst this includes perceptions (and evaluations) of current nation-building efforts at the European level (?Europe-building?), we can also observe similar trends towards another geopolitical power in the region, Russia, which cherishes close links to some Eastern European countries and promotes mutual solidarity.

In practice, one observes that people are mostly pragmatic with regard to their self-identification?. They to identify, or position themselves along a multitude of parameters: geographical, political, linguistic, social, cultural, religious etc. The choice is dynamic and varies from generation to

generation within the same ethnic minority group; it has mostly social rather than ethnic or nationalist character. One observes the trend toward the maximization of comfort and efficiency of all kinds of social communications and clear appeal for the high degree of various aspects of security and stability. The latter includes the protection of cultural habits alongside the guarantees for successful integration; it ranges from the prevailing affiliation with the closest social circles (family, neighbourhood) up to the larger geo-political constituents (such as European Union?, Europe?, Eastern Europe?.)

For instance, in our total sample, the respondents image of the European Union is highly correlated with their attitudes regarding the (potential) benefit that their resident country has from being an EU member ($r = .684$, $p = .000$). In the questionnaire we asked them using a scale of four (benefits a lot, rather benefits, rather does not benefit, does not benefit it all) if they thought that their country benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union. Those respondents who live in countries without EU membership were asked if they thought that their country would or would not benefit.

Analysis across all minority groups shows that the majority of respondents (59.2%) think their resident country benefits from being a member of the European Union (13.2% benefits/would benefit a lot, 45% rather benefits/would benefit a lot).

In only three (out of twelve) ethnic minority groups the majority does not believe in their country benefiting: Russians in Latvia, who also had the most negative image of the European Union, Slovaks in Hungary and Poles in Belarus. Two ethnic minority groups stick out because of their very high scores regarding benefits: Ukrainians in Poland, who also had the most positive image of the EU, and Hungarians in Ukraine.

Furthermore, in our empirical study, we have found generational as well as country specific differences in how the ethnic minority populations perceive and define Europe and the European Union. In general, the young respondents were more oriented towards Europe. However, the qualitative results showed that young members of certain ethnic minority groups have more an Eastern European identity. They seem to miss characteristics of the Eastern culture in what they perceive as Europe which makes them less likely to identify with Europe or the European Union.

Closeness to East Europe basically follows political and geographical imperatives. Thus, as our quantitative results show, Russians, who are inclined to consider themselves Europeans or Eurasians, object against being called East Europeans?. Conversely, there is relatively high acceptance of this term for Poles and Hungarians in the Ukraine and to a lesser degree, Hungarians in Slovakia.

Russian Identity-Neo-Soviet Identity

Before 1917, a common Russian identity might only have existed among the intelligentsia though Smith (2008) discerns outlines of a Russian nation much earlier in history. Whilst this amounted to Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality (Szporluk, 1998: 306), anti-Russian sentiments were formulated in the revolutionary cause in opposition to the rather empire-encompassing scope of Russian identity. In the 20th century, Russian identity has experienced ups and downs. The Russian Soviet Republic was designed as the diffuse territorial left-over once non-Russian nationalities have established their Soviet Republics (cf. Brubaker, 1996: 48-51). At first, a Russian national project was dismissed as a remnant from tsarist or capitalist ideology by Lenin and Stalin. Only later Russian culture and

institutions recovered from this oppression. Socialism, universalism, and the Russian language were celebrated as Russian virtues when building the Soviet people?, though this was rather a supranational than national project (Brubaker, 1996: 28) in the 1930s. However, Szporluk reminds us to consider the possibility of treating communism as a kind of nationalism (1998: 303).

Russian self-worth benefited largely from the Great Patriotic War-the Second World War as it was called in the Soviet Union. Though the Soviet state was never conceived as a Russian nation-state, Smith adds Despite the constant official criticism of Great Russian chauvinism, there is little doubt that a Russian state nationalism was an intrinsic component, albeit unofficial, of the subsequent ideologies and policies of the Soviet leadership (2008: 178). This contradicts Brubaker who argues that nationhood was placed only at a sub-state level (Brubaker, 1996). With the gradual withering away of Soviet statehood, political and economic decline (e.g. Easterly and Fisher, 1995), non-Russian ethnic groups and nationalities capitalized on this situation to clearly differentiate themselves from Russia and the Soviet Union within their own sub-state republics. However, real hatred towards the Russian occupants only (re)occurred in the Baltic republics, Western Ukraine and the Caucasus republics (for more details see, Hosking, 2004).

In the meantime, demographic developments lead to a decline in the Russian population, but also a re-shuffling of the power relations within the Soviet Union away from ethnic Russians. This decline in Russian influence was then associated with the Soviet Union which was increasingly perceived as inappropriate for Russians (Szporluk, 1998). According to Hosking (2004), Russia finally opted out of the union and established herself as a nation-state. Soon, other republics declared independence and The Russians were the victims of their own greatest triumph (Hosking, 2004: 152). From 1990 until today, Russian nationalism adheres to a belief in something what is heavily contested: a potential revision of greatness and empire, though this does not necessarily mean a reincorporation of territory (see also Brubaker, 1996). Russian aspirations lament in nostalgia about the greatness of their achievements whilst struggling with a different reality. This tension adds fuel to the fire of Russian identity, which is only attractive to some whilst loathed by others. It is based on the Soviet people and finds supporters outside the Russian Federation as well (Szporluk, 1998). It is worthwhile to note here a similarity to what Appiah (2005) calls a self-undermining identity. It does not seem that the social conception of being Russian neatly correspond to what Russia actually represents today.

Is it, then, a matter of choice, whether mutually exclusive, or not, to develop European and Russian identities in Eastern European border regions And how would this blend into other, maybe much more established identities such as national ones These are questions which demand careful consideration. Here, the notion of cosmopolitanism might offer a way to conceptualise competing identity claims, which seem, only if viewed from a narrow-minded angle, exclusive in the first place.

Cosmopolitan Identity

In recent years, the concept of cosmopolitanism broke into the discourse about nationalism and national identity and how it relates to pluralism, diversity, transnationalism, shifting commitments and so on (for instance, Appiah, 2006; Beck, 2007; Fine, 2007; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). Though a cosmopolitan identity most likely would not establish another territory-based?i.e. global?identity, it is argued that it rather alters existing identities such as national and European ones in particular ways (cf. Delanty, 2002). What is this new talk about cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanisation (Beck, 2006) then all about And what distinguishes cosmopolitanism from other approaches to identities such

as pluralism or universalism (cf. Pichler, forthcoming) In the remainder of this paper, we turn to these questions and try to give answers relevant for the analysis of EU border identities in Eastern Europe and beyond.

The term cosmopolitanism is currently associated with a wide range of meanings as expressed in a plethora of combinations with adjectives or nouns (e.g. Delanty, 2006; Pollock et al., 2000; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002). Various aspects of law, morality, responsibilities, politics, openness towards others and their otherness, (cognitive) skills and behaviour are intermingled in the new conceptualisation of the cosmopolitan (e.g. Beck, 2002; Held, 2000; Kwok Bun, 2003; Mann, 1997; Nash, 1997). For Held (2005), cosmopolitanism rests upon eight basic principles constituting a new legal, political and social framework based on autonomy and impartial reasoning. Whereas earlier studies associated cosmopolitans with jet-setters, yuppies and globe-trotters, i.e. a small and upper-middle-class urban population, the global shift rendered cosmopolitanism a wider-spread experience. In due course, understandings of cosmopolitanism multiplied and Vertovec and Cohen (2002) summarise at least six different meanings of cosmopolitanism: a condition; a philosophy or world view; political cosmopolitanism in terms of international cooperation as well as multiple affiliations; attitudes or dispositions; and practices and competences. This highlights the encompassing character of cosmopolitanism both at the individual level (attitudes, multiple affiliations, practices, competences) as well as its structural component (condition, political cooperation)

What distinguishes (new) cosmopolitanism is the simultaneous recognition of similarities and differences. It is a particular form of societal treatment of cultural otherness in that it not only tolerates differences between people but stimulates comprehension of the other (Beck and Grande, 2007a; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002). On the one hand, cosmopolitanism wrenches open established boundaries by reflecting upon old and new similarities and shared experience among people from various parts of the world. Cosmopolitanism refers to greater world openness, global awareness, loyalty to human kind, self-reflection and self-problematisation in order to establish new communities (Hollinger, 2002). On the other hand, differences are not perceived as obstacles for a wider human community. To the contrary, they are a source of political, cultural and individual enrichment.

Cosmopolitanism partially leans on other theoretical approaches towards social life such as universalism, nationalism, pluralism or particularism (most obviously in their liberal forms). Whereas particularism overemphasises differences, universalism neglects difference in its efforts to emphasise similarity (Hollinger, 2002). Cosmopolitanism considers both similarity and difference in understanding the need for enclosure and the possibility of multiple identities and affiliations to groups on the one hand and individualism on the other (Appiah, 2005). Cosmopolitanism differs from nationalism because the latter neglects differences within its territory but stresses them externally. Nationalism shares the belief that a homogeneous nation is different from other nations (e.g. Anderson, 1983), where the latter also resemble homogeneous groups. More often than not, nationalism produces a vertical hierarchy between nations: the own nation is special (patriotism) and superior to others (ethnocentrism). The cosmopolitan acknowledges internal heterogeneity, appreciates external difference and there is no hierarchy across societies. Beck's realistic cosmopolitanism complies with the above mentioned relations to universalism, nationalism, etc: What is realistic about this new cosmopolitan realism follows in part from the mutual correction of these semantic elements, in part from the fact that their combination is greater than the sum of its parts (2006: 58). In cosmopolitan realism particular (political) collectivities recognise legitimate interests of each other and include them in the calculation of their own interests by following universal norms about tolerance and dealing with otherness (Beck and Grande, 2007b).

The cases of Europe and Eastern Europe are an instructive example to explore the manifestation of cosmopolitanism. The European Union is regarded as the first international model which begins to resemble the cosmopolitan model (Archibugi, 1998: 219). Europe is described as a broader community in economic, political and also cultural terms (e.g. Brubaker, 2004; Calhoun, 2002; Delanty, 1995; Habermas, 2003). Within the process of European integration, boundaries of how much difference is acceptable and where similarity ends are constantly negotiated as can be seen in Council meetings, the documents of the EU (e.g. the constitution), community law (majority rule), the debate about Turkey's potential accession and, finally, the relationship with bordering countries, especially Russia. Although critically oriented towards the current state of European integration, Beck and Grande (2007b) propose a cosmopolitan outlook on Europe. Moreover, they argue that some of the EU's successful mechanisms (e.g. the monetary union, the principle of mutual recognition and the method of open coordination) incorporate a cosmopolitan principle and that in strengthening civil participation in Europe, the EU crisis could be redeemed in the near future.

These processes may stimulate the awareness and membership of a European community although the significance of European identity might lag behind other forms of identification (for a recent example, see Grundy and Jamieson, 2007).

Discussion

The previous sections have clearly shown that identity formation is not a straightforward process. Notwithstanding the many different interest groups (ethnic, national) involved in the making of identities, we must also pay tribute to the difficult context in which identities are negotiated in Europe at the moment. In the global age, national, regional and supranational identities are likely to borrow from each other; they could sometimes contradict each other, whilst occasionally they might hardly be separated from each other. What are the preconditions that an identity takes a particular form and aspires to a particular nature?, for instance a cosmopolitan nationalism (Eckersley, 2007; Nielson, 2003) Bearing with Brubaker (1996), we must also consider the interplay of these various identities and nationalisms, and especially so in Eastern Europe.

We have seen that these issues of identity can be approached from various angles. Liberalism, nationalism, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and many other ideas and/or ideologies offer somewhat different solutions, however, within a clearly liberal frame of references. That is, we have secluded our approaches from illiberal ones. The most important questions we want to ask concern the relationship between various national (ethnic) groups in liberal (or liberalizing) democracies in Eastern Europe. How can, following Appiah (2005), various and competing identity claims be brought together without challenging individual autonomy and group rights And what limitations do we have to consider when assessing identity claims of various groups in opposition to each other This is a great challenge for European societies, and there might be many attempts to find solutions across the continent. On top of that, we believe that we can learn additional lessons if we compare these more liberal contexts to other ones. What are these identities, their nature, strategies and discourses like in less liberal countries such as, arguably, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine?

One possible and probably a very fruitful way to assess empirically nationalisms and other identities in Eastern European border countries draws on Wimmer's (2008) attempt at explaining ethnic boundary making. His multilevel process theory includes four main elements. It provides a comprehensive picture of how ethnic boundaries are made. It shows which actors are involved, what

structures play a role and how micro level and macro level processes contribute to boundary making. His distinction between the field?, making?, and nature of boundaries is particularly helpful in analysing ethnic boundaries and we think that we can apply this rigorous theoretical framework to the analysis of identities and identity making in a straightforward way.

Wimmer argues that the nature and characteristics of boundaries vary according to the power inequality as well as the reach of the consensus?whether it is partial or encompassing, asymmetric or symmetric. Institutions and networks?the other main variables in the model?influence whether ethnic boundaries matter at all, and if they do, whom they encompass and whom they include. They are less important for understanding the properties of the boundaries (2008: 1001, emphasis in original).

Figure 1 Explaining National Identity Making. Adapted from Wimmer (2008)

[see the full text file - attached]

Here, we have more clearly separated strength and stability of boundaries from their other characteristics. This reflects on strengths of feelings of belonging, attachment, loyalty and identification. Although Wimmer considers the stability of boundaries as an outcome of their nature, we have closed the circular boundary/national group making process by presenting it as a fourth important component, which is itself most significantly shaped by other characteristics of the boundary. The demarcation between the micro and the macro level is deliberately not presented as a straight line to highlight the multilevel character of Wimmer?s (2008) agreeable theoretical approach. Finally, the framework emphasises the contextual embeddedness of these processes. To our mind, this means that we must be highly alert of context-specifics in the empirical assessment of national and other identities.

Whereas this theory might have the most appeal to the analysis of national identities, we can also think of ways how to relate it to the making of sub-national (regional) or supra-national (European, Great Russian, Slavonic) identities. Here, we will also be interested in the processes of identity formation and making at various levels and by various actors. The basic rules and procedures also apply here, but we might encounter more difficulties in defining the nature of boundaries, more dissent about strategies, and the rather concealed processes in the field of boundary making. Nonetheless, it might be of crucial relevance to discuss these issues with a view to various competing identity claims at all levels in order to satisfy our ambitions concerning the study of identities in Eastern European border regions.

This is also where the notion of cosmopolitanism comes in. By analysing the nature of boundaries and their strengths, we can comment on, for instance, their openness towards otherness; whether people make similar or different identity claims within the same or in different groups; or the exclusivity or inclusiveness towards other identities. However, we can also address issues about supranational identities, when examining identity making. What are these like? What are the similarities between nations or ethnic groups when compared to others? And what is particular about one specific identity?

We are not only interested in the strengths of various identities, but mainly regard the contents of identities crucial in establishing a cause for any form of identification. Following Wimmer?s (2008) multilevel theory of ethnic boundary making as a process, we conceive of the nature of identities, i.e. their contents, accessibility and salience in everyday life, as crucial in explaining the strengths and stability. This approach, however, also allows for a critical examination of processes at the macro level. With the help of Wimmer?s (2008) concepts we can describe identity making discourses with respect to the field and the reached consensus over a strategy or lack thereof. Thereby, the field refers

to involved actors (institutions), networks and power relationships between them. Strategies concern the aims which various groups pursue having reached a consensus about them (or not). In a third step, we can link both analyses and integrate micro level and macro level studies of identity making. We thereby hope to shed more light on these processes in Eastern Europe and gain important insights into current political processes there.

Further aspects of theoretical considerations related to the studies of the interplay of national and regional identities are summarized in several working papers produced by project's experts Dr. Florian Paichler, Dr. Ivailo Vassiliev and Dr. Timofei Agarin. These will be published shortly in a thematic volume Theoretical and methodological backgrounds for the studies of European, national and regional identities of ethnic minorities in European borderlands (<http://www.enri-east.net/project-results/en/>)

CONSTRUCTING EMPIRICAL BASE FOR THE STUDY

General frameworks of the empirical study

Research on identities in Europe has established considerable knowledge about different kinds and relationships between various forms of belonging in modern European societies. However, this body of research is often biased in various ways. First, research on contemporary identities in Europe in general and European identity in particular tends to be normative in the sense that the conceptualisation of what European identity is like is blended with wishful thinking of what Europe should be. Second, there is an overemphasis on theoretical constructs and top-down perspectives as opposed to empirically informed accounts of actual practices, attitudes and perceptions. Third, descriptions and classifications take precedence over in-depth analysis and explanations of the complexities of the processes involved. Fourth, empirical research and generalisations tend to focus on Western Europe with little or no discussion of East European societies.

Admittedly, conventional research has delivered important insights into different aspects of identity formation in Europe. Nevertheless, it also tends to prioritise analysis in which identity formation is either considerably de-contextualised from broader social processes in contemporary European societies, or does not provide adequate understanding of how people are making sense of Europe, what it means to them to be European and ways in which European identities are interacting with other loyalties and feelings of belonging, as in regional or ethnic cultures. The latter shortfall is mainly due to the gap between research and actual practices.

In the implemented study, the top-down approach of normative concepts is complemented by a detailed account of bottom-up processes of identity formation. It is by drawing on actual practices that we can claim to be in a position to address the importance of both macro and micro influences in a broader historical perspective.

A useful vantage point to explore the complex embedded nature of European identities is looking at the restructuring of the nation-state. It could be argued that while in the beginning of the 20th century nation building and national reproduction needed the protection of the state and conversely, the state needed the nation in order to legitimise and reproduce itself. This is no longer the case. First, the resources necessary for the reproduction of national identities, due to changes in technology and the growing significance of non-state institutions, are increasingly located outside state borders. In

addition, within an environment where there is a pluralisation of identities, both within and beyond the borders of the nation-state as well as the growing significance of cosmopolitan identities, the nation state is no longer able to offer stable, coherent and authoritative definitions of the nation.

Secondly, states are increasingly legitimising themselves in a much narrower way by rearranging their broad social responsibilities that were typical for the classical nation-state. This restructuring of the relationship between state and society is often associated with a general trend of a growing dominance of economics over politics, which is exacerbated by the impact of neo-liberal views. Some authors have argued that neo-liberal interpretations of the economy are increasingly influential in broader social restructuring leading towards the creation of a market society. In many European states this has entailed a dramatic decrease in welfare provisions while in others this has been associated with much more nuanced policies. The latter argument is well captured in what Jessop (2002) sees as the transition from a Keynesian Welfare National State towards a Schumpeterian Workfare post-national Regimes.

Thirdly, it can also be argued that we are also witnessing the destabilisation of the previously dominant position of national identities within the classical nation-state. One possible explanation of this fact can be found in the vast literature on modernisation, reflexivity and the changing character of risk in modern society (Beck 1992). More specifically, these changes can be associated with the growing significance of non-state institutions at the sub-national, supra-national and the global levels where they have challenged the primacy of attachment to the nation. Rather than putting an end to the nation these changes have led to the development of much more complex relationships between different identities and loyalties at different levels. Thus, on the one hand we observe the emergence of identities at different levels (supra-national, sub-national and global), and on the other their complex relationships on the level of individual and group experiences and practices.

Objects of study (regions, countries, ethnic groups, minorities etc.)

To start with, we must first identify and clearly define the objects of our study. Logically, there would be a hierarchy of such objects.

The meta-level object is the Eastern area of the new European borderland?.

First operational level objects would be the four smaller regions of the above area, namely: Baltic Region, Eastern Europe and Central Eastern Europe.

The next analytical level must be represented by individual countries and ethnic groups.

Country

Definition of a country is relatively simple and obvious. The only important remark would be the one of historical nature (a temporal rule). Namely, we consider individual countries in their political and geographical shapes as of now (=2008).

A simple observation shows that the last political change is formally dated as of 2001-2004 (the formal extension of the European Union, when a few countries became first candidates and then full EU members.) Thus, the political status of some countries has changed during the last decade.

As to the formal geographical shape (?moved borders?), the last changes took place in 1989-1991. Main changes were the reunification of Germany (elimination of an inter-state border) and the transformation of several internal politically-administrative borders between the former USSR republics (no border control) into the fully international political borders (full border control).

Ethnic group

Definition of an ethnic group is much more complicated. First, such groups may vary in their size and, therefore in their political weights?. These variations could be projected on a scale, as shown, for instance, below in Table 1.

Table 1. When size matters: different types of ethnic groups and their political weights.

[see the full text file - attached]

A working definition of an ethnic group used in the project is as follows:

Ethnic group a set of people with a common culture, who as a rule speak a common language and are conscious of their identity and their difference from other groups.

An ethnic group may consist of three parts:

- a. ethnic core (basic component, which lives compactly on a specific territory),
- b. ethnic periphery (compact subgroup, which is separated from the core group, e.g. Russians in the Crimea or in Kazakhstan or in East Estonia) and
- c. ethnic diaspora (a separated subgroup, which lives on the territory of another titular nation).

A few particular implications could be derived from this definition.

Thus, an ethnic group is distinguished by subjective and objective criteria, as outlined below (Table 2). Subjective criteria of an ethnic identity could be generally revealed from inside (for instance, in the course of an interview), while objective criteria should be known and applied from outside?. In the later case, a researcher should know some preliminary information about a group in advance.

Table 2. Subjective and objective criteria to distinguish an ethnic group

[see the full text file - attached]

Furthermore, we must be aware that the phenomenon of ethnicity (ethnic self-identification) is always a complex thing, just as any other social phenomena. This is an ideal (or pure?) type in Weberian sense. In reality, people would always maintain a multiple identity?, or a mix of several ethnic (national) identities, combined with some geographical (regional and local) identities, as well as cultural and professional identities, etc.

Even if we limit our considerations only to the ethno-national aspects, we must assume that the same ethnicity would have different intensity in different groups. Thus, one can hypothesize that an ethnic Russian living in a village in a central province of the European part of Russia would be more Russian (let?s take him or her as a 100% Russian), then another ethnic Russian living in a Ukrainian capital Kyuiv would possibly be an 75% Russian. In the latter case the remaining 25% would go for a certain

degree of Ukrainianess (wide use of Ukrainian language, involvement in Ukrainian political life, understanding of Ukrainian culture etc.) Similarly, an ethnic Ukrainian living in the Eastern province of the country, working in an industry that cooperates predominantly with Russia and, on top of that, graduated from a Russian University and married with a Russian women, would hardly maintain more than 50% of its original Ukrainian social ethnicity.

The above considerations would be of critical importance for the correct interpretation groups holding the same ethnic names (say, Russians or Hungarians?), but living in the locations different to their real or hypothetical ethnic motherlands (say, both of these ethnic groups in Ukraine).

Furthermore, using the above ethnic weights (or ethnic percentage?) would allow to apply mathematical procedures of the analysis of fuzzy sets (?gradual membership in a set?) for quantitative analysis.

Table 3. Logical matrix to account for simple and complex ethnic identities

[see the full text file - attached]

Figure 1. Graphical illustration of quantitative features of ethnic groups of different growths.

[see the full text file - attached]

Practical implication: As a primary attempt, we have developed a model that can be applied for the reconstruction of a set of national samples for the big quantitative survey, assuming that all 18 dyads are included.

[For the detailed consideration of sampling issues - see the full text file - attached]

MAJOR EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS

Identity and its main components

Ethnicity is one of many salient characteristics individuals or groups use to describe their self or are used by others to position them within the social order (ascription). Members of ethnic minority groups in the ENRI region are well aware of their ethnic identity, but, generally speaking, the relative importance of this type of identity is decreasing among the studied minority groups in CEE region over the generations and substituted by others, like profession or gender.

Figure 2. Main identity components preferred by respondents (multiple choices)

[see the full text file - attached]

Figure 3. Relative importance of self-identification markers (all age groups versus youth)

[see the full text file - attached]

The ethno-national identity includes such factors as closeness to different reference objects (own ethnic group, country of ethnic origin, affiliation with particular religion or geographical area, linguistic habits and preferences, etc.). It is strongest in those states where the minorities were (or are)

under political pressure. In the first line, this relates to Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, and to Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia. Together with the Poles in Lithuania, these minorities share the feeling that they have lost their former status as a ruling nation.

However, strongest feelings of closeness are directed to the locations (settlements), where respondents live (91% on average), followed by the own ethnic minority group (85%) and the hosting country (87%). These three strongest objects of attachments are followed with a considerable distance by a country of respondents ethnic origins (60%) and Europe or Eastern Europe (49% and 42% respectively).

Figure 4. Respondents feel close to:

[see the full text file - attached]

Vehicular languages of ethnic minorities in the CEE region

Russian minorities in the Baltic states and Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia appear to be most adamant to use their own mother tongue as far as this is possible in every-day interactions. Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region, and Poles in Ukraine use the language of the host country most frequently, closely followed by the Slovaks in Hungary. The latter minorities can therefore be called the most adaptive ethnic groups, the former the most self-assertive?.

Figure 5. Languages most often spoken at home

[see the full text file - attached]

Thus, it appears that the Russian and Hungarian languages are the most resistant native languages among the corresponding residual ethnic minorities, while the Polish, Slovakian and Lithuanian languages are the most neglected native languages of the relevant residual ethnic groups.

With regard to the use of language of the host country, Russian language is a preferred means of communication at home among Lithuanians in Kaliningrad oblast, and Ukrainian is a vehicular language for Poles living in Ukraine.

In contrast, Lithuanian and Latvian are the most neglected languages among the groups under study: it is NOT the actively spoken home language for all three ethnic minorities in these countries. Russians and Hungarians, once again, are champions in their non-usage of the language of the country they live in.

Table 5 Three groups with regard to the usage of own ethnic language at home

[see the full text file - attached]

Table 6. Three groups with regard to the usage of COUNTRY language at home

[see the full text file - attached]

Ethno-national distinction versus adaptation

Nevertheless, the adherence to the native ethnic language does not translate into a feeling of being closer to the kin country (a country of factual or historical ethnic origin). On the contrary, with the exception of Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia, all minorities are much more at home in their host countries than in their countries of ethnic origin. They are more interested in home affairs than in events in their kin country. Younger generations become estranged from their kin group abroad. Needless to say, they regard themselves loyal citizens of their host countries.

Figure 6. Respondents interest in politics in their host countries and countries of ethnic origins

[see the full text file - attached]

In order to define the degree to which minorities were ready to adapt, respondents were invited to express their position toward two options: It is better to adapt and blend in larger society and It is better to preserve own customs and traditions (four-points scale for each option).

Figure 7. Instinctive and adaptive strategies: diasporas balances (simple differences between the sums of strongly agree and rather agree for ether option)

[see the full text file - attached]

Perceived ethno-national tensions and experienced discrimination

The ENRI-VIS data reveal that among all types of social tensions that one can observe in any society, the most disturbing factors are the classical types of social anxiety, such as strains between poor and rich people (a general stress factor for up to 80% of the respondents) or between older and younger generations (up 68% on average). However, the ethno-national types of tensions have been reported by almost every second respondent in the whole sample. Regarding the tensions between respondents own ethnic groups and the majority of country population, on average 9% of respondents reports a lot of tension and 37% some tensions?; these values vary considerably from country to country in the ENRI sample, as shown in the chart below.

Reports of Poles and Russians in Lithuania, Russians in Latvia, Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia as well as Ukrainians in Poland on tensions between their ethnic groups and the majority of the population are above the average values in the ENRI sample.

Figure 8. Perceived tension: between respondent's ethnic group and the majority

[see the full text file - attached]

There is, of course, a significant distance between the perceived tension and the factually experienced discrimination of harassment due ethno-national factors. The chart below demonstrates the gap between 46% of respondents perceiving tension between their ethnic groups and the majority and the 11% of respondents who reported having indeed experienced discrimination or harassment due to their ethnicity or national origin during the last year.

Figure 9. Experienced discrimination or harassment during the last 12 months due to ethnic or national origins of a respondent

[see the full text file - attached]

Hungarians in Ukraine, Ukrainians in Poland and Russians in Latvia report factual discrimination during the last 12 months above average values in the whole sample.

Cases of ethno-national discrimination or harassment require a closer look. We can distinguish between two distinct venues of discrimination, namely public institutions governed by explicitly stated legal rules (authorities, universities, schools, etc.) and everyday private encounters governed by informal rules of conduct (neighborhoods, streets, shops and restaurants, etc.) The chart below illustrates that the probability of ethno-national discrimination or harassment in the traditional social domains is much higher than at the locations, which are under stronger governmental control.

Figure 10. Overview of the probability of ethno-national discrimination in public and civil society domains per ethnic minority groups (with the relation to average rate)

[see the full text file - attached]

Respondents from the following groups report highest rates of experienced discrimination in 2008-2009 (i.e. during the twelve months before the survey): Hungarians in Ukraine with especially high values of reported discrimination in public domains; this group is followed by all minorities in the ENRI sample from Latvia and Lithuania. However, the latter groups point to the private domains as major venues of discrimination or harassment.

The groups reporting the lowest levels of discrimination or harassment, or even the absence of such negative experience at any domain are Poles in Ukraine, Belarusians in Poland and Poles in Belarus, Lithuanians in Russia and Slovaks in Ukraine.

Attitudes toward Europe and the European Union

The general image of the European Union among the ENRI respondents is generally positive or neutral and it is somewhat more positive among the ethnic minority respondents from non-EU countries. Nevertheless, for most minority members, Europe and the EU provide no emotional point of reference. For some, like the Hungarians in Ukraine, the EU is a potential moral and financial support partner. Most minority members in the new EU member states have mixed feelings about the Union. Some respondents mention the protection from globalization that small member states receive from the big community.

Figure 11. General image of European Union

[see the full text file - attached]

When it comes to the cultural and political recognition and protection of the rights of ethnic minorities, the European Union serves as an ultimate reference point for ethnic groups outside of the EU. This contrasts with rather skeptical assessment of the ethnic minority groups within the eastern part of the EU regarding the factual improvement of the cultural and political situation of these groups after their countries have joined the European Union.

Figure 12. Respondents saying there is a considerably improved situation after the

(for CIS respondents: would improve after a hypothetical) joining the EU with regard to?

[see the full text file - attached]

Institutional trust, political participation and civil society

ENRI-VIS data on the distribution of trust in institutions of the respondents' home (host) countries reveal a quite diversified pattern. One can observe two distinct groups of countries: The institutions in Belarus, Poland and Russia are trusted by representatives of the minorities under study well above the average values in the sample. In contrast, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine appear as countries with the least trusted institutions in the eyes of the ethnic groups in the sample.

A possible explanation for this pattern is the higher or lesser stability of political regimes in these countries and the degree of general social and economic satisfaction of population, as well as the levels of political freedoms and civil security. Thus, the political regimes in Belarus, Poland and Russia have been quite stable during the last post-transition decade (no general revolutions or major political clashes) and the level of economic prosperity in these countries was growing steadily. At the same time, Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia have experienced significant political turbulences during this time and the population is suffering considerably from the depriving economic situation.

Table 7. Trust in institutions among ethnic minorities in CEE (trust completely + rather trust)

[see the full text file - attached]

Nevertheless, the level of participation in national and European parliamentary elections is quite high among the ethnic minorities in CEE region, with the exception of groups with higher shares of recent migrants or those who are not eligible for voting (i.e. non-citizens).

Figure 13. Shares of respondents that took part in the last parliamentary elections in the HOST country

[see the full text file - attached]

Figure 14. Shares of respondents that took part in the last elections to the European Parliament

[see the full text file - attached]

The next chart illustrates the situation with members of particular ethnic minority groups who cannot vote at national or European elections.

Figure 15. Respondents reported being NOT eligible for the participation in parliamentary elections

[see the full text file - attached]

The empirical study shows that the dominant form of self-organization of ethnic minority groups is to set up cultural NGOs. Churches and religious organizations are centres of community life, particularly in the CIS countries under study and with Ukrainians in Poland. With the notable exception of Hungarians in Ukraine, membership in political parties has remained limited (around 3% on average). Overall, the most vibrant civil societies among the minorities can be found with Hungarians in Ukraine and Poles in Ukraine.

Figure 16. Index of participation in civil society organizations (any reported membership related to the total sample)

[see the full text file - attached]

Collective ethno-national identities: historical memories, feelings of pride, trust in people and cross-border networking

Collective historical memory is a precondition for group identity. Living memory tends to be substituted by myths if it is repressed or dissolved in a dominant national narrative. Tacit?, non-recognized narratives and myths can leap over into a perception of being discriminated, harassed or in other ways disrespected, as the example of Ukrainians in Poland shows, where no ethnic group concerned has come to terms with the common violent past and there are still unresolved redistribution issues such as entitlements to land, etc.

Pride in one's own ethnic group is strongest with Hungarians in Ukraine, Poles in Ukraine and Poles in Lithuania and weakest with Slovaks in Hungary as well as Lithuanians in the Kaliningrad region. Russians in Lithuania and Latvia, although they share with Poles and Hungarians the historical role of a ruling nation in multinational empires, express no pride in the history of their own ethnic group. Only very small percentages of Belarusians in Poland, of Poles in Belarus and of Russians in Lithuania assess their Soviet past as positive.

Table 8. Minority groups with highest and weakest degrees of pride per different objects pride (triplets)

[see the full text file - attached]

A further observation from the ENRI-VIS data demonstrates the distribution of the level of trust in people depending particular types ethno-national relations to a respondent. On the next chart one can see that on average, members of ethnic minority groups would have more trust toward the people of their own ethnic group (the average value for the whole sample is 82% and the variation among different groups is the lowest in that case). This most trusted group is followed by the people from the country of respondent's ethnic origin (79% on average) and third-turn-trust would be given to the compatriots of the main nationality of the country a respondent lives in (76%).

Figure 17. Trust in people in general and different groups of people among ethnic minorities in CEE

[see the full text file - attached]

A natural strength of ethnic minorities is their multi-cultural capital that includes the various forms of cultural heritage of the host country and the country of their ethnic origin. As a rule, members of ethnic minorities are fluent in two or more languages and they understand and appreciate music of both countries they relate to. The multiple personal ties that connect them with their kin-countries are an additional asset. The results of ENRI-VIS show how intensive these contacts of ethnic minority respondents are with their relatives, friends and other people in the countries of their ethnic origins.

Cross-border networking is most intensive with Hungarians in Ukraine. Belarusians in Poland and Slovaks in Hungary have the fewest regular contacts with relatives, friends or others in the kin country.

Figure 18. Respondents having regular contacts with relatives, friends and others in the country of their ethnic origin

[see the full text file - attached]

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

General remarks

Overall, ENRI confirms the finding that a tolerant political and social environment promotes integration processes which preserve cultural and ethnic identities, while discrimination and political pressure generates defiant nationalism as a response.

Members of studied ethnic minorities:

- demonstrate clearly multi-faceted types of identity (a highly pragmatic mix of a variety of available cultural and social assets?);
- they are mostly attached to the areas where they have been born and educated;
- are loyal citizens-cum-patriots-cum-Europeans.

Preferred patterns of identities have dynamic character and depend primarily on social status, settlement patterns and visibility

- Ethnicity and ethnic languages of minorities are important, but not dominating factors contributing to identity formation;
- The strongest predictors for particular types of identity would be age and social status of minority members, followed by their religious affiliation (in specific cases);
- Settlement patterns vary significantly among different ethnic minorities, ranging from highly dispersed population (such as Poles in Ukraine) up to very concentrated mode of living (Hungarians in Ukraine), there could be mostly urban population (Russians in Latvia) or mostly rural population (Slovaks in Hungary);
- In a European context, attempts to discriminate minorities usually lead to their higher visibility in media and political landscape.

EU (Europe) is popular as an ideal and a model to emulate with regard to peaceful and respectful approach to resolve possible inter-cultural and social conflicts and the European Union in general as well as individual national and regional governments have the responsibility to moderate in complex ethno-political conflicts involving minorities, titular nations and sending nations;

Inter-ethnic conflicts and tensions can be resolved most efficiently, if their individual components are properly addressed (cultural heritage, languages, social justice) and the socio-economic environment in general is favourable;

Targeted support should be extended to interethnic, trans-cultural and cross-border actions. This may range from PR support for such action to support for member states (or Eastern Partnership states) for granting tax breaks or extending beneficial loan schemes to interethnic start-ups.

Since the integration of the young generation (under 30 years of age) is rapidly progressing and their attitudes toward Europe are more favourable than those of the 30+ generations. Efforts should therefore concentrate on the young generation which is more receptive to European liberal values. Linguistic diversity is highest among the ENRI minorities, but its assets are not always honoured appropriately.

An investment into student mobility, from high school to universities can improve the attitude towards the EU. An attempt should be made to involve the governments in the kin countries, civil society, organizations and the media to stimulate the Europeanness instead of the exclusive ethnic affiliation of young minority members.

The Interplay of Identities, cultures and politics

The empirical data generated by ENRI corroborate findings and observations made in the framework of previous studies and represent a snapshot which permits to draw conclusions about the evolution of identities and identity construction in the region under study. Our data show the enormous importance of such everyday practices as language use, information retrieval and communication, and the patterns of social contacts for the reproduction and evolution of identities. A tolerant political and social environment promotes assimilation processes, discrimination and political pressure generates defiant nationalism as a response. The minorities in the ENRI region are well aware of their ethnic identity, but, generally speaking, the relative importance of this type of identity is decreasing and substituted by others, like profession or gender. This process can be precisely traced over the generations. The Eastern borderlands of the EU are a specific region where distant and recent politics characterized by conflicts between superpowers have created numerous ethnic enclaves in the states existing today. Consequently, ethnic identity is strongest in those states where the minorities were (or are) under political pressure. In the first line, this relates to Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, and to Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia. Together with the Poles in Lithuania, these minorities share the feeling that they have lost their former status as a ruling nation. For minorities which report little or no political pressure, culture, not politics, becomes the main repository of identity and the major focal point where ethnic awareness is kept alive. Particularly for minorities in Poland with its strong presence of the Catholic Church, this role is played by the minority churches. Close-knit groups like the Slovaks in Hungary, the Poles in Ukraine or the Belarusians in Poland have the strongest local identity and the strongest links to the local community.

Nations between the states

Russian minorities in the Baltic states and Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia appear to be most adamant to use their own mother tongue as far as this is possible in every-day interactions. Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region and Poles in Ukraine use the language of the host country most frequently, closely followed by the Slovaks in Hungary. The latter minorities can therefore be called the most adaptive ethnic groups, the former the most self-assertive?. Nevertheless, this does not translate into a feeling to be closer to the kin country. On the contrary, with the exception of Hungarians in Ukraine, all minorities are much more at home in their host countries than in their countries of ethnic origin. Younger generations become estranged from their kin group abroad. Needless to say, they regard themselves loyal citizens of their host countries. This is despite reported cases of discrimination on ethnic grounds as well as perceived ethnic tensions: Close to 50% of

minority members experience some or a lot of tensions between the majority population and minority members and a little over 10% of all respondents has reported harassment or discrimination on ethnic grounds during the preceding year. This, however, varies greatly over the individual minorities. Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia, Poles and Russians in Lithuania report ethnic tensions in their host countries. Lithuanians in Kaliningrad, Belarusians in Lithuania and Poles in Belarus experience no tensions between ethnic groups. Complaints about discrimination and harassment are most frequent by Hungarians in Ukraine, followed by Ukrainians in Poland, Russians in Latvia and Hungarians in Slovakia. The inclination to migrate is relatively low: 35% of Russians in Latvia and Lithuania consider emigration, in case they would find appropriate conditions in the target countries (for around 30% of potential migrants, Russia). For comparison, 15% of Hungarians in Ukraine and less than 3% of Slovaks in Hungary consider (e-)migration.

For most minority members, Europe and the EU provides no emotional hub. For some, like the Hungarians in Ukraine, it is a potential moral and financial support partner. Most minority members in the new EU member states have mixed feelings about the Union: On the one hand, it is blamed for such social ills as drug trafficking and for aggressive and greedy business practices, but open borders and increased opportunities for education are welcomed in a pragmatic way. Some respondents mention the protection from globalization that small member states receive from the big community.

Self-organization and representation of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe

ENRI-VIS data on the distribution of trust show a persistent pattern over the minorities. Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia, Poles in Lithuania and Russians in Latvia and Lithuania are the most cautious nations in dealing with people in general. This picture is reproduced in the low trust of these populations toward members of their own ethnic group, toward people of their home country as well as those from their kin country. When it comes to trust toward specific host country institutions (police, media, government, etc.), the usual suspects are joined by the Poles in Ukraine. Low trust in political institutions translates into low interest in politics. Nevertheless, the level of political participation is surprisingly high and comparable to European democracies (participation in national elections close to 70%). The dominant form of self-organization is to set up cultural NGOs. Churches and religious organizations are centers of community life, particularly in the CIS countries under study and with Ukrainians in Poland. With the notable exception of Hungarians in Ukraine, membership in political parties has remained limited (around 3% on average). Overall, the most vibrant civil societies among the minorities can be found with Hungarians in Ukraine and Poles in Ukraine.

Cross-border networking is most intensive with Hungarians in Ukraine. Belarusians in Poland and Slovaks in Hungary have the fewest regular contacts with relatives, friends or others in the kin country.

Historical path and collective memories of ethnic minorities in CEE

Collective historical memory is a precondition for group identity. Living memory tends to be substituted by myths if it is repressed or dissolved in a dominant national narrative. Tacit?, non-recognized narratives and myths can leap over into a perception of being discriminated, harassed or in other ways disrespected, as the example of Ukrainians in Poland shows, where no ethnic group

concerned has come to terms with the common violent past and there are still unresolved redistribution issues such as entitlements to land, etc.

Ethnic pride can be used as indicator of identification with the historical legacy of one's own nation. Pride in one's own ethnic group is strongest with Hungarians in Ukraine, Poles in Ukraine and Poles in Lithuania and weakest with Slovaks in Hungary as well as Lithuanians in the Kaliningrad region. Russians in Lithuania and Latvia, although they share with Poles and Hungarians the historical role of a ruling nation in multinational empires, express no pride in the history of their own ethnic group. This finding is complemented by the results of the ENRI web analysis, according to which Stalinist rule is experienced very negatively by factually all minorities. Only very small percentages of Belarusians in Poland, of Poles in Belarus and of Russians in Lithuania assess their Soviet past as positive.

Musical preferences carry information on ethnic identity in general and the degree of identification with the legacy of one's own nation. Folk music is the preferred musical genre for Slovaks in Hungary and Poles in Lithuania, while this is the case for only a small percentage of polled Russians in Latvia and Lithuania.

Potential Impact:

MAJOR PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY (potential impact)

Policy Implications

A number of policy recommendations are suggested by our data and findings:

Minority issues are complex issues with political, economic, social and cultural components which cut across administrative and legal boundaries and jurisdictions. In both the EU and its neighbourhood, minority policies have ceased to be a purely national prerogative, but have become an issue of international concern, monitoring, supervision and regulation. The cooperation between national institutions (local administrations, legislative bodies, governments), civil society and international organizations is the key for a deepened integration of ethnic minorities into the body politics and the society of the host countries. On top of that, they involve several political players with specific and often different political agendas, namely the host country, the kin (sending) country, the EU and other pan-European international organizations such as the Council of Europe. It goes without saying that all policies and actions in this field must be carried out on the basis of European values. What this implies in terms of effects for the minorities, the populations of the host and the kin states must be clearly defined and communicated. For example, affirmative action programs (positive discrimination of ethnic minorities) should be limited in time and range as well as justified so as not to contradict the principle of fairness and reciprocity. Policies aiming at a higher degree of integration must have a sufficient level of complexity in that all measures must be orientated toward the paramount political objective of integration without the loss of identity. EU policies must be multilateral and involve the ethnic kin (sending) states in a coordinated way.

Discrimination on ethnic grounds is not a separate phenomenon, but comes with other types of discrimination (gender, unequal regional development, etc.). This calls for a complex approach in politics designed to eliminate discrimination. While it is certainly imperative and legitimate to focus on gender equality and the situation of Roma and Sintis (as illustrated by the equality summit in Poznan), the unequal outcomes of national and international policies for the ethnic minorities should be considered as well.

ENRI data reflect the political and social tensions in the region. At this point, the intensity of perceived tensions and discrimination is highest in Slovakia and Ukraine, especially when it comes to the young generation of Hungarians. On the other hand, political rhetoric is often misleading. In the first place, this relates to the Russian minorities in Latvia and Lithuania, where every day interethnic communication and interaction is smooth and without serious problems despite the occasional noise emitted by nationalist political organizations in Latvia and Russia. The same relates to extremist web sites run by Hungarian servers.

Practical implications for civil society organizations

Attempts at creating concerted ethno-national narratives have failed in the past or have not been undertaken. As the interaction among the local ENRI teams have demonstrated, significant scientific consensus can be achieved despite the sometimes staggering differences in the official historical and political narratives. The elaboration of consented historiographical and political narratives by mixed teams of historians, sociologists and political scientists should be promoted and supported.

Information policy: The struggle against prejudices calls for smart solutions. The moral condemnation of the pernicious consequences of nationalism and radicalism is unconvincing and does not change beliefs developed and held as a result of perceived discrimination. On the other hand, stereotypes have, as a rule, negative and positive components. The latter are a point of departure for information campaigning.

To counteract nationalist propaganda, the education and information policies and campaigns of various societal actors should focus on best practices, on examples of successful integration and professional careers. An attempt should be made to enlist the governments, civil society, international organizations and important NGOs as well as the media in a concerted information campaign which demonstrates the benefits of cultural and linguistic diversity in concrete, down-to-earth terms. In TV ads and other media releases, minority members can report on their career achievements, successful business activities or other best practices. Particularly, minority members who have made careers within EU institutions should be recruited.

The experience gathered during such campaigns could be valuable for image campaigning in other problematic cases (Romas and Sintis).

Practical implications for governmental bodies and officials at local, regional, national and international levels

Inside the EU itself as well as among international organizations and NGOs, there must be a higher degree of coordination among the various bodies dealing with minority issues in one way or another (The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the commissioners for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, Development, Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth, International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, Regional Policy, as well as the relevant GDs, etc.), the OSCE, the Council of Europe. Minority policies as a cross-cutting issue are an inevitable component of regional development policies (especially in case of compact settlement of minorities), investment and fiscal policy as well as business decisions concerning areas inhabited by minorities. When it comes to necessary program funding from government or international institutions, cash-strapped budgets are apt to increase the inclination for coordinated action.

Efforts should therefore concentrate on the young generation which is more receptive to European liberal values. This is particularly important in the hot spots identified by ENRI-East, namely the Baltics, Slovakia and Ukraine. Youth in these countries is literally waiting to be picked up by European cultural, political and business institutions. An investment into student mobility, from high school to universities can improve the attitude towards the EU. The image of the EU as an opportunity space has remained unaffected by the financial and the debt crises.

An attempt should be made to involve the governments in the kin countries, civil society, organizations such as the World Union of Hungarians (Magyarok Vilagszövetsége) and the media to stimulate the Europeanness instead of the exclusive ethnic affiliation of young minority members.

The internet and other modern media should be enlisted to a much higher extent in efforts to counteract patriotic campaigning and to deepen the integration of minorities.

The biographical interviews revealed some practical insight into notions of both pan-European and intra-country social cohesion, which, at the policy level is particularly relevant to the EU's mandate on social cohesion. These findings were a product of the micro-level/bottom up approach in that they arose from semi-structured biographical conversations and could not be ascertained from macro-level surveys or purely quantitative analysis. Nonetheless, the findings from the bottom-up approach implications can certainly be applied to a much larger context and analysed at a greater scale.

This issue of ethnic minority media should be examined further at the European policy level in order to explore the ways in which expanding pan-regional media broadcasting can act as a source of information and education for the variety of ethnic groups residing in Central and Eastern Europe. In turn, the widening of a shared media pool can be used to engender a greater sense of shared heritage, awareness of current affairs and overall social cohesion between neighbouring nations and ethnic groups.

This provides themes for further analysis at the policy level, but particularly taking into account the extent to which expanding ethnic minority media creates greater social awareness and harmony on the one hand, and provokes greater divisiveness or hatred between ethnic groups on the other. What is clear from the biographical interviews is that a healthy balance within this spectrum is not found within all the countries analysed, and that country-specific and ethnic group-specific approaches need to be taken to EU media policy throughout the region.

The importance of this trans-cultural media consumption is linked to language in which the media is consumed: policymakers should explore the effects of education of European languages as a further tool of social cohesions. What the biographical interviews of ethnic minorities in both Hungary and Slovakia revealed was that those respondents who were bilingual in both the ethnic minority and minority languages could engage to a greater extent with the different media sources, and were thus less socially prejudiced towards/shared greater collective interests with different ethnic groups living within the same country.

OVERVIEW OF MAIN DISSEMINATION MEASURES AND TOOLS

Target Groups (stakeholders)

Dissemination and exploitation of project results constitute an important cluster of activities of the project and beyond. Therefore, the wider audience of practitioners, representatives of the policy and legislative communities as well as representatives of the civil society and the academic sphere is and will be informed about the project. Key information about the design, scope, results and findings of the project is distributed to these thematic stakeholders via a variety of tools.

The following target groups for the dissemination are:

- Academic communities (researchers, university teachers, consultants, etc.)
- Governmental officials dealing with minority, migration and integration issues in Eastern Europe and on national, international, regional and local (municipal) levels
- Leaders and experts of NGOs who are active in this sector in these regions.

Major dissemination tools

The main dissemination and discussion tools employed in the project are:

- Web-site (<http://www.enri-east.net>) contains easy accessible information about the project design and the consortium as well as links to publications and results, a thematic library and detailed information about conferences and presentations to download. The project website will be still available at least five years after the official end of the project. However there will be no updates. The full version is provided in English, limited versions are provided in Russian and German.
- Two Project leaflets inform briefly about the project, its main achievements and events (the first issue was provided in English, Russian and German; the second issue was provided in English).
- Project Newsletters (three issues) containing more detailed information about the project, its main research themes, progress and research results.
- Project E-Newsletter sent out on irregular basis, depending on availability of the brand new project information, or to invite stakeholders and other interested parties to open project events.

The ENRI-East print products are available at the project website and may be downloaded for free. They are and will be distributed to any interested party at academic and non-academic conferences, meetings and other events to spread awareness of the project and its outcomes.

ENRI-East Working Paper Series

The ENR-East project working paper series summarises the main project outcomes and constitute the core corpus of detailed information to disseminate project results and to inform key target groups on ENRI-East findings.

So far, the ENRI-East working paper series consist of 22 volumes, covering the following topics:

Summarizing and generalizing reports

1. Theoretical and methodological backgrounds for the studies of European, national and regional identities of ethnic minorities in European borderlands
2. Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities among the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (main comparative results of the ENRI-East empirical research)
3. ENRI-East Thematic Comparative papers and synopses of authored articles of ENRI-East experts (9 tender papers and further bibliography of project-related publications)

Contextual and empirical reports on ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (edited by respective team leaders)

4. The Polish Minority in Belarus
5. The Slovak Minority in Hungary
6. The Russian Minority in Latvia
7. The Belarusian Minority in Lithuania
8. The Polish Minority in Lithuania
9. The Russian Minority in Lithuania
10. The Belarusian Minority in Poland
11. The Ukrainian Minority in Poland
12. The Lithuanian Minority in Russia (Kaliningrad oblast)
13. The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia
14. The Hungarian Minority in Ukraine
15. The Polish Minority in Ukraine
16. Special Case Study Germany (re-emigrated ethnic Germans and Jewish quota refugees?)

Series of empirical technical reports

ENRI-VIS: Values and Identities Survey

17. Methodology and implementation of ENRI-VIS (Technical report)
18. ENRI-VIS Reference book (major cross-tabulations and coding details)

Qualitative studies of ENRI-East project

19. Methodological report on Biographical Interviews (ENRI-BIO)

20. Methodological report on Expert Interviews (ENRI-EXI)

Special Studies

21. Methodological report on the pilot study on Musical cultures and identities (ENRI-MUSIC)
22. Methodological report and main findings of the Pilot study of web-spaces (ENRI-BLOG)

The ENRI-East working paper series, produced by the coordinating team and written by the project consortium, is available for download at the public section of the project website under project results.

Especially the contextual and empirical reports on ethnic minorities include conclusions where research conclusions and practical implications for policy makers are summarised.

List of Websites:

<http://www.enri-east.net>

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