Periodic Reporting for period 1 - Austere Reasons (Do Desires, and only Desires, Justify Action? Evaluating a Radical Version of 'Internalism about Reasons') Reporting period: 2017-07-01 to 2018-08-31 Summary of the context and overall objectives of the project The main problem addressed in this project is/has been some aspects of the theory of reasons: do reasons arise only from desires, and (if so) what are the implications of this -- would it be depressing, and what are its consequences for rational choice?There are two main reasons why this research, despite being very theoretical, can be important for society. The first is that there is some plausibility to the thought that if all reasons (which justify actions) arise from our desires, then 'anything goes': there are no objective standards of, for example, morality. The truth is of course more complicated than this, but the public implications are potentially worring.Second, I have been particularly concerned with cases where our reasons seem to involve vagueness or indeterminacy. Such questions are important because several of the most important challenges facing society -- most notably climate change -- involve such vagueness. This is because it is almost irresistible to think that given the scale of climate change, any particular flight or other individual-level carbon emission will 'make no difference.The overall objectives have been to make philosophical progress on several fronts (for more detail please see the next question), and to engage in dissemination and public engagement. Work performed from the beginning of the project to the end of the period covered by the report and main results achieved so far "As part of my core research activities, I have completed a review of David Sobel’s ""From Valuing to Value"", which has been published in Analysis. I have also written several journal articles, which I am currently finishing or submitting for publication.These papers, each of which defends a conclusion of some of my work during the project, includes an argument that the large size of the universe supports broadly anti-realist views about reasons and values, that when our reasons are indeterminate or 'unsharp' in a certain way, then it is impermissible to complete some sequences of actions even though each action in that sequence might be individually permissible, that nihilism and other ""anti-realist"" moral views are indeed depressing and affect what we have reason to do, and that we should organise healthcare providers in such away that doctors and other medical professionals do not face ethically questionable incentives.My main public engagement activities have been first, the editing of some relevant pages on Wikipedia, and second, a post on The Conversation about climate change and carbon offsets, and associated discussion in the comments and on Reddit: https://theconversation.com/how-a-moral-philosopher-justifies-his-carbon-footprint-95809In terms of neworking and dissemination, besides writing the above papers for publications, I gave several visiting speaker and conference presentations -- including at the American Philosophical Association, Bern, Groningen, Berlin, Trinity (Dublin), York, and Lund -- and comments on a paper at the Conference by Women in Philosophy at Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.I also attended a Nihilism workshop in Manchester, many sessions of the Moral Philosophy Seminar in Oxford.I also made a number of internal presentations, most formally the following two: First, a joint presentation to the Reading Ethics and Poltical Philosophy group and Leverhulme Centre for Climate Justice arguing that because of vagueness (substantial climate change is the result of many negligible carbon emissions), it may be difficult or impossible to provide justifying reasons for any particular restrictions on carbon emissions. Second, a Work in Progress presentation to the Reading philosophy department discussing the impact of healthcare marketisation on the reasons that doctors have, and whether different healthcare structures are thereby morally compromised (for example by introducing moral hazard).Training activities included a ‘paper clinic’ in February for Reading PhD students, using a ‘no presentation’ method which I picked up during my Berlin secondment, continuing to supervise PhD students, and gaining several new supervisees, and finally several speakers were invited to Reading with the possibility of using MSCA funding (whether this funding was actually used or funding was secured from elsewhere). These included Wouter Kalf, Bart Streumer, Adam Bales (within-UK), and Elizabeth Harman.I went on two secondments, to Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin from 13 November to 14 December 2017 with Professor Thomas Schmidt, and to Rijksuniversiteit Groningen from 26 May to 3 June 2018, with Professor Bart Streumer. During these secondments, I presented papers including the above discussed results from the work." Progress beyond the state of the art and expected potential impact (including the socio-economic impact and the wider societal implications of the project so far) The primary progress beyond the state of the art has been in developing some original philosophical ideas in more depth, in particular those which I discuss in my papers.I have defended a new account of 'promotion': when we have a reason to bring about some outcome, how does that connect to reasons to do particular actions? Whether or not my view is ultimately sustainable, it represents an addition to the state of the art. I've also contributed a new argument that the vast size of the universe and our small size should make us somewhat skeptical of strongly realist views about the nature of value and morality, contrary to the trend of most published work on this question. In a similar vein, I have argued that nihilism and other 'irrealist' views are indeed depressing.Though it is possible to see wider and socio-economic impacts of each of these discussions, in particular the final one, these impacts are some distance away. At present, the impact of the project is primarily academic, including dissemination and public engagement.
