Centralised and top-down decision-making processes is prevailing in the field of reception. In the context of the “European refugee crisis”, decision-making became even more centralised with an increasing concentration of competences and power in the hands of central governments.
There was a growing internal heterogeneity of reception systems during “European refugee crisis”, due to the setting up of emergency reception solutions by the central government, the increasing number and diversity of organisations involved in the management of reception facilities, the development of locally-based solutions, the gaps in state capacity and the different compensating role played by the international organisations. When convergence is achieved, it generally happens within localities and on a small scale, via horizontal coordination efforts, as a bottom-up process.
Main limitations of harmonisation: 1)discretion offered by Directives has led to divergences in transposition into domestic frameworks. 2) ambiguity and discretion inherent in Regulations has carried risks of inconsistent application at national level. 3) the ‘enforcement deficit’ in EU legislation has allowed Member States to maintain aspects of their legislation and practice despite clear violations of EU law.
Main discrepancies regarding burden sharing was evident in the empirical research, which showed that there is a mismatch between the theory of establishing the country responsible with asylum applications (on the basis of the first country of arrival principle) and the reality of migrants’ lived experiences, who engage in secondary movements largely due to family and (perceived) employment opportunities elsewhere. In light of this, it is suggested that the family element of the Dublin Regulation), should be used more frequently when determining the country in charge with the examination of asylum applications, than it is currently the case.
The analysis of political debates showed that both migration and the responsibility vis-à-vis refugees in Europe have become an issue of politicisation. Political discourses should highlight that more Europe does not mean necessarily less national sovereignty. In fact, it is the other way around: failing to give a common response to migration and asylum leads to non-functioning migration and asylum policies which in turn question national sovereignty and the very legitimacy of EU and national institutions.
While the technical side of the CEAS requires further details to bring the negotiated recast instruments to an end, the political side of the CEAS requires pressing the restart button, a frank political discussion, the involvement of external experts and the establishment of a common vision on the political direction of EU asylum policy, in a spirit of solidarity.
Scenarios and policy alternatives, 1) at the state level: If the future of the CEAS could lie in a differentiated application of its directives it might be feasible to agree on further harmonization towards a joint set of regulations between a number of member states who are willing to. This would result in the de facto decoupling of EU-membership from unconditional participation in the CEAS. Such a coalition of willing states could then effectively address responsibility sharing between them.
Secondary movement of asylum seekers and refugees goes against CEAS' current design and is thus deemed undesirable by governments. Stakeholders tend to be of a different opinion: secondary movements accommodate integration needs of asylum seekers and refugees. Not facilitating such needs increases societal costs and political concerns. Ideally, asylum seekers and refugees are distributed according to such needs and matched with national or sub-national demands for their human capital. As long as this remains outside CEAS's scope, it is recommendable to facilitate free movement of recognized refugees within the EU's labor market. 2) at the sub-state level: Instead of further harmonization between national governments, stakeholders recognize and commend that the CEAS overall already does produce its intended results, something from which its imperfections and sometimes large deviations should not distract. Moreover, these deviations might, at least in part, be addressed by actors presently not or insufficiently involved in CEAS's implementation.
All through Europe smaller and larger municipalities and notably cities ask for a bigger role in the reception of asylum seekers and integration of refugees. Considerable frustration exists regarding their limited scope for tailor made policies, lack of governmental resources and political support at the national level. This offers potential room for more involvement of the EC and EP respectively in providing such resources, ideally in a direct relationship. These resources would likely increase societies' integration capacities and subsequently enlarge public support for refugee reception.
