Could war-gaming help turn back the hands of the doomsday clock?
Created in 1947, the doomsday clock(opens in new window) indicates how close humanity is to largely self-inflicted destruction through nuclear risks, climate change, disruptive technologies and biosecurity breaches. We are currently 85 seconds away. As Jean-François Bélanger(opens in new window) from the Royal Danish Defence College(opens in new window) notes: ”Over the last couple of years, Russia has used nuclear threats to deter NATO Allies from supporting Ukraine after the Russian invasion. Meanwhile, intelligence agencies continue to assess the likelihood of a full-scale Russian attack on NATO Allies, while monitoring constant hybrid provocations, such as by drone or cyberattack.” Against this backdrop, the United States is increasingly retreating from its substantial contributions to European security, prompting Europe to rethink defence strategies and spending. Exploring these dynamics, the WESUE project – coordinated by Bélanger and hosted by the University of Southern Denmark’s Center for War Studies(opens in new window) – used war-gaming to assess the paths leading to conflict escalation or constraint, especially nuclear. ”As decision-making largely a private process, there’s not much data available so I wanted to simulate it in realistic scenarios,” adds Bélanger. “This is an emerging field in terms of both methods and use, boosted by the arrival of artificial intelligence.”
Understanding the mechanisms of nuclear escalation
The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions(opens in new window) supported WESUE project was inspired by the work of Bélanger’s former mentor Julian Spencer-Churchill(opens in new window), especially his 2006 paper analysing the contours of an American military operation against Iran. To simulate various escalation scenarios in Europe, Bélanger created a few paper-based war games, prompting the development of digital iterations. “If you can observe the decision-making process of two adversaries in a conflict situation, you have a war game,” says Bélanger. Inspired by recent defence-related events, the resulting software used various criteria to explore aspects of deterrence, such as strength of commitment to NATO or an adversary’s aggressiveness, objectives and methods. One topical simulation was of a Russian attack against a Baltic state. The scenarios explored included NATO’s possible political and military responses if Article V was invoked – an attack on one member constituting an attack on all – justifying a full-scale NATO self-defence response. These early digital versions are currently informing the construction of a digital war game in conjunction with Royal Danish Defence College, University of Oxford(opens in new window) and King’s College London(opens in new window) colleagues, focused on nuclear escalation and the integration of the Nordic Air Forces.
Internalised vs externalised deterrents
A key area of interest for Bélanger (and currently the topic of a pending book with T.V. Paul)(opens in new window) was assessing the nuclearisation of North Korea and prospects for the Korean Peninsula. Bélanger argues that smaller states have two basic deterrence options: internalisation or externalisation. Internalising means developing capabilities fully within the state’s control, as with Iran and North Korea; while externalising involves building alliances, such as NATO, and/or siding with proxies – most obviously with the United States. ”Externalised deterrents are typically more versatile and quicker to implement, but can be weakened by constant smaller-scale highly targeted provocations; whereas internalised deterrents are economically and politically costly, but once established prove effective,” explains Bélanger. Bélanger argues that the relative advantages and disadvantages of these options are currently under unprecedented scrutiny. ”This plays out in the arguments over deterrence investments, particularly with NATO Allies agreeing to spend 5 % of GDP on defence by 2035(opens in new window). But if that investment buys long-range weaponry, countries must be willing to use them. I’m not sure all Allies have made that mindset shift,” adds Bélanger.
